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A.No. 
I1EONA FAYE DOW et 
FACTURING 
fendants GEORGE 
Independent of Contractors-Injuries 
After Completion Work.-The rule that a contractor 
is not Hable for to third persons resulting from his 
n"""~'"~"'' in construction of the work after the work is com-
pleted and the owner, because of lack of privity of 
contract, is no the law; the modern tendency is to 
hold building contractors to the standard of reasonable 
care for the of anyone who may foreseeably be 
ue,,u>:eu.ce, even after acceptance of the work. 
[2] owner of property cannot es-
condition on his property by 
contractor assume the duty of construct-
ing or a or chatteL 
[3] !d.-Liability of Contractors.-A general contractor has super-
vision over the entire building and its construction, including 
the work performed by a subcontractor, and where he negli-
gently creates a condition, either by himself or through a 
subcontractor, he is primarily responsible for that condition 
and the consequences that may follow from it; what is placed 
in the building is within his knowledge, and where 
it involves a defective appliance which is covered and hidden 
by the walls in the course of construction, the responsibility 
for such defect should rest on him as well as on the sub-
contractor. 
[4] Negligence-Care by of Chattels.-When a supplier 
of chattels the goods, it is immaterial to his liability 
for negligence that he may have had another supply the 
product; he is nevertheless liable because he has vouched for 
the chattels as his own by taking the contract. 
[5] Independent Contractors-Liability of Contractors.-Where a 
general contractor for the construction of a building supplies 
[1] Negligence of building or construction contractor as ground 
of liability on his for or damage to third person 
occurring after completion and aceeptance of the work, note, 13 
A.L.R.2d 191. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors,. § 26; 
Am.Jur., §52. 
:M:cK. Dig. References: 3, 5, 7, 8, Independent Contractors, 
§ 29; [2] Independent Contractors, § 22; [4, 6) Negligence, §53; 
[9] Negligence, §55. 
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many parts, as well as labor, most of which are probably not 
fabricated by him but by independent contractors or sellers, 
he is liable to third persons for negligence with respect to the 
parts so supplied. 
[6] Negligence-Care by Supplier of Chattels.-One who puts out 
as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is sub-
ject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer. 
[7] I:adependent Contractors-Liability of Contractors.-A general 
contractor who puts out a completed house including gas 
heaters which appear as his product should be liable for the 
negligent installation of a defective gas heater by his sub-
contractor, especially where he prepared the plans and speci-
fications for the house. 
[8] !d.-Liability of Contractors.-A general contractor construct-
ing a building and having general control over his subcontrac-
tors and their works has the duty to inspect appliances 
installed in the building, including a defective gas heater. 
[9] Negligence-Care by Persons Installing Dangerous Instrumen-
talities.-One who installs a dangerous instrumentality, of 
which a gas heater is an example, is charged with knowledge of 
the particular dangers characteristic of the instrumentality 
and of the manner and means by which the dangers are likely 
to eventuate into actual harm, and. with the duty to use a 
degree of care commensurate with the danger, to guard or 
insulate against it. 
[10] Independent Contractors-Liability of Contractors.-Where 
the liability of a general contractor constructing a house was 
established by proof that a defective gas heater was installed 
by his subcontractor, which was the proximate cause of the 
deaths of plaintiff's husband and children, it was immaterial 
whether the subcontractor was an employee of the general 
contractor or an independent contractor; it was the general 
contractor's responsibility to construct a house equipped with 
an adequate heating system and he could not negate that 
responsibility by delegating to the other, even as a subcontrac-
tor, the work of installing the necessary equipment for the 
heating system; the fact that he did not discover the defect 
did not relieve him of liability, since it was a question of fact 
for the jury whether he was negligent in permitting the house 
to be occupied with the defective heater. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. Arthur L. Mundo, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for wrongful deaths. Judgment for 
plaintiffs affirmed. 
to as 
The deaths were caused 
oxide from 
W. Mcinnis for 
is the widow of 
and Arthur Dow. 




the home of the Dow 
who installed the 
'-'""u"v"• as general con-
1950 and February, 
1951; defendant also the and specifications. 
Mr. Muth was the then owner of the property. Muth never 
occupied the house. He sold it to Mr. and Mrs. Petty in 
1951; the house until they sold it to 
the Dows in 1953. Mrs. left her home with 
one son, the other for a visit in the middle 
west on 1954. 26 at 
8 p. m. and found the doors and windows closed, the hall 
gas heater on and Mr. Dow and the two children dead from 
o::caucc•cJ.C>w, ""''"""""" for the installation in 
in the living room, 
B.T.U. gas heaters, one 
controlled, and the other 
Defendant contracted with 
to install the heaters.* 
from the Holly Manufacturing 
install them in the walls. 
in the manually controlled. 
Dover, a licensed !Jnnu:uuJ.f; 





above the hall heater, a "sec-
was also installed in the wall 
of the heater and below the ceiling and around 
*There 1s a dispute as to whether Dover was an independent sub-
contractor, defendant claiming he was as a matter of law; more will be 
said of that later. 
Association seal 
It appears that above the 
which is a metal box 
heater. 
There is evidence that after the deaths the hall heater, 
including the were down the 
area for the outflow the fine; that the flame was 
yellow instead of blue as it should have 
overfiring much gas the 
of passage ; that there was soot on 
the grill near the and on the waH and ; that 
the heater had been to accommodate the secondary 
heat exchanger and had the wrong burner for it; that the 
orifices which admitted the gas for were too large, 
being proper for a 35,000 rather than a B. T.U. heater; 
that the heater was a B.T.U. ; that as a result 
of the larger orifices over a period 
of time, would result in earbou monoxide the house 
from the heater; that carbon monoxide a colorless and odor-
less gas, and it was from the heater in quan-
tities when tested after the deaths the of installing 
a secondary heat on a heater like the hall heater 
would be that the heater would be and a 
substantial portion of the of combustion would spill 
out of the relief in the draft head ; that one could 
not install a heat on the hall heater with-
out altering the appliance; that the use of a secondary heat 
ex.changer with the hall heater would cause flue products to 
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spill out of the relief opening in the draft head ; that products 
of combustion would come into the room because of poorly 
constructed vent features; that because the hall heater was not 
adapted to a secondary heat exchanger it was not good practice 
to use one and would be more of a hazard if the heater were 
overtired. While there is some inconsistency within the testi-
mony of some of plaintiffs' witnesses and there is otherwise 
a conflict in the evidence, those were matters for resolution by 
the finder of fact, the jury here. The evidence is thus suffi-
cient to show the installation of a defective heater, which 
clearly constituted negligence. Whether that negligence was 
on the part of Dover or defendant is unimportant for the 
reasons hereinafter appearing. 
[1] It should first be observed that the owner for whom 
the house was built by defendant general contractor had 
accepted the house and it had been transferred by him, with 
title finally vesting in the Dows. At one time this was an 
obstacle to recovery from the general contractor on the theory 
that there was no privity of contract between the contractor 
and the person injured, but it is no longer the law, as obvi-
ously, the problem presented is the same as where a manu-
facturer negligently manufactures an article which subse-
quently injures someone other than the purchaser of the 
article. (See famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
217 N.Y. 382 [111 N.E. 1050, Ann.Cas. 1916C 440, L.R.A. 
1916F 696].) Commenting on this subject a well-known text 
writer states: "Where the defendant has in fact misperformed 
his contract, and is to be charged with 'misfeasance' resulting 
in injury to a third person, it is to be expected that liability 
to third persons will be found more readily; and in general 
this has been true. Even here, however, the great obstacle 
has been the notion of the necessity of 'privity of contract' 
inherited from the misinterpretation of Winterbottom v. 
Wright . ... All this is now ancient history. The analogy of 
the seller has prevailed, and the late decisions are agreed that 
the man who negligently repairs a vehicle or any other chattel 
is liable to others who may be injured because of that negli-
gence, to the same extent as if he had made and sold the 
chattel in the first instance.'' (Prosser on Torts, (2d ed.) 
p. 517.) And with respect to building contractors : "Until 
quite recent years it was the prevailing rule that the con-
tractor would be liable for any injury resulting from his 
negligence before his work was completed, but that his respon-
sibility was terminated and he was not liable to any third 
Feb.1958] Dow v. HoLLY MANUFACTURING Co. 725 
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person once the structure was completed and accepted by the 
owner .... 
"The present state of the law is not altogether clear because 
of the survival of so many of these exceptions, which afford 
an opportunity to hold the defendant liable without stating 
any general rule. It appears, however, that the analogy of 
MacPherson v. Buick JJ1 otor Co. is at last being accepted. 
Several recent decisions have pla~;ed building contractors on 
the same footing as sellers of goods, and have held them to 
the general standard of reasonable care for the protection of 
anyone who may foreseeably be endangered by the negligence, 
even after acceptance of the work." (Prosser on Torts, (2d 
ed.) p. 517.) (See also Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal.2d 228 [201 
P.2d 1, 13 A.L.R.2d 183] ; Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des L'Jiloines 
Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908; Hunter v. Quality Homes, 45 Del. 
100 [68 A.2d 620]; Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142 [47 N.W. 
2d 901]; Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78 [164 
N.E. 162, 60 A.L.R. 353]; Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 
186 Minn. 265 [243 N.W. 387] ; Rest., Torts, § 385; cases 
collected 42 Va.L.Rev. 403; 13 A.L.R.2d 191.) 
Turning to the question of whether the general contractor 
was liable for the negligent installation of a defective gas 
heater by Dover, his subcontractor, which brought death to 
plaintiff's husband and children, there are analogous situa-
tions pointing to liability. 
[2] It has been held that the owner of property cannot 
escape liability for a dangerous condition on his property by 
having an independent contractor assume the duty of con-
structing or repairing a building or chattel. (Knell v. Morris, 
39 Cal.2d 450 [247 P.2d 352]; Brown v. George Pepperdine 
Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256 [143 P.2d 929]; Snyder v. South-
ern Calif. Edison Co., 44 Cal.2d 793 [285 P.2d 912] .) 
[3] There is no reasonable distinction between the owner's 
inability to escape liability and that of the contractor. The 
contractor, equally with the owner of the property, has super-
vision over the entire building and its construction, including 
the work performed by a subcontractor, and where he negli-
gently creates a condition, either by himself or through a 
subcontractor, he is primarily responsible for that condition 
and the consequences that may follow from it. He is in full 
control of the construction and knows or should know what is 
being placed in the building. Indeed, what is placed there is 
peculiarly within his knowledge, and where, as here, it involves 
a defective appliance which is covered and hidden by the walls 
[49 C.2d 
for such defect 
contractor is bound 
of chattels when 
that he 
contractors 
is liable to third persons 
v. Francis H. & Co., 114 
, affirmed 117 N.J.L. 101 [186 A. 832]; 
220 Mass. 593 [108 N.E. 
uiwh·""·'· 171 Miss. 253 [164 So. 231]; 
Moines Steel Co., sttpm, 166 l!'.2d 
45 Del. 100 [68 A.2d 620] ; 
259 Wis. 142 [47 N.W.2d 901]; McCloud v. 
79 286; Inman v. Bing hampton 
1 559 N.Y.S.2d 79] ; Rest. 
comment is here pertinent: 
the Ford [14 F.2d 253 (56 
52 A.L.R ] rule insofar as it is contrary 
to the present v. 231 F.2d 469 (97 
App.D.C ], the court has demolished one of the few 
remnants of the classic doctrine which in-
sulated builders and manufacturers from liability to ultimate 
users and consumers Both the majority and the minority 
found no the McPherson rule to building 
seems to be ou the 
contractors will 
to persons not in privity of 
not to differentiate be-
tween the two classes of contractors. the same 
rules of law to both. The good s~nse of 
the McPherson been so widely praised and 
"127 
§ that may refer to 
under a trade name, there is no substantial difference between 
that situation and a contractor who out a house 
•u~;•wuu;:, gas heaters which appear as his n""·"r~''"'t 
the defendant here the and for 
the house. no valid distinction between a 
and subcon-
and the manufacturer 
not fabricated by it to install 
in the car, and assembled car. There should be 
liability in both cases. it should be observed 
that the general contractor had the duty to appliances 
installed in the and should have the instal-
lation of the defective heater here. He had general control 
over all his subcontractors and their works. Although there is 
evidence that he made such an inspection, the jury could have 
disbelieved him or have found that it was not a sufficient 
inspection. 
[9] It should be remembered that ''One who .•. installs 
a dangerous instrumentality, of which a gas heater is an 
example, is in such installation charged by law (1) with 
knowledge of the particular characteristic of the 
instrumentality and of the manner and means by which the 
danger or dangers are to eventuate into actual harm, 
and (2) with the duty to use that degree of care which is 
commensurate with the to or insulate against 
it. Such a rule has its roots in an impelling necessity in the 
promotion of the and of life and property-it 
has its foundation in the essence of the social compact." 
(American Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Grimes, 192 Miss. 125 
[ 4 So.2d 890, ; see Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 415 
[135 A. 20, 52 A.L.R. 858] .) Gas heaters have the inherent 
capacity for great harm unless they are properly made and 
installed, especially since their defects are usually concealed 
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from the occupant of the building and the deadly gas, carbon 
monoxide, gives no warning of its presence. They may be 
compared to the gas they burn which is inherently dangerous 
and the duty with respect to which cannot be delegated (see 
Ambriz v. Petrolane, Ltd., ante, p. 470 [319 P.2d 1]) for 
they are the instrumentalities which use and should control 
and make safe the use of the gas. [10] Since the liability 
of defendant Bledsoe was established by proof of the fact that 
a defective heater was installed in the house by Dover, which 
was the proximate cause of the deaths of plaintiff's husband 
and children, it is immaterial whether Dover was an employee 
of Bledsoe or an independent contractor. It was defendant's 
responsibility to construct a house equipped with an adequate 
heating system and he could not negate that responsibility 
by delegating to Dover, even as a subcontractor, the work of 
installing the necessary equipment for said heating system. 
It is obvious that if he had discovered the defect in the 
heater installed by Dover, he would have required Dover to 
correct the defect or replace the heater. The fact that he 
did not discover the defect does not relieve him of liability, 
as it was a question of fact for the jury as to whether he 
was negligent in permitting the house to be occupied with the 
defective heater which caused the deaths for which recovery 
was allowed. 
Defendant complains of a jury instruction which stated that 
there was a presumption that Dover was an employee of 
defendant when he was an independent contractor as a matter 
of law and of the exclusion of e·vidence bearing on the nature 
of their relation to each other. In view of the result we have 
reached herein those matters are immaterial and defendant 
was not prejudiced. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
McComb, J ., dissented. 
